II-Durban Outcomes.

Without doubt, the Durban COP made some progress on a few potentially significant issues, yet it is also undeniable that there is a huge gap between what nations have agreed to do in Durban and what science is saying is necessary to prevent dangerous anthropocentric interference with the climate system. As we shall see, once again, in Durban resolution of the most important climate issues were deferred to future negotiations.

On a positive note, the major accomplishments of the Durban COP were agreements to:

1. Negotiate an agreement by no later than 2015 that would apply for the first time all parties under the UNFCCC, that is both developed and developing countries, on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, transparency of action, and capacity building, and that such agreement will come into effect and be implemented by 2020. (UNFCCC, 2011a) 2. Initiate a new Green Climate Fund as the financial mechanism under the UNFCCC in regard to mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.(UNFCCC, 2011b) Several European countries in Durban pledged more than $50 billion in seed money to establish this fund, an amount that is expected to rise to $100 billion per year by 2020.

Durban also produced several other agreements that could eventually be helpful in implementing a comprehensive international solution to climate change on technology transfer, reference standards to be used in the program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+), sources of funding for REDD+, an extension of the Kyoto Protocol for a second commitment period, and procedures on national climate adaptation planning. (For copies of these decisions, see UNFCCC, 2011c)

Despite these accomplishments, strong criticism of the Durban outcome is warranted because the agreement to cooperate on a new binding legal instrument is only an agreement to negotiate an agreement about which almost nothing has been settled and that will not likely become effective until 2020.

Because there is a growing scientific consensus that the world is running out of time to prevent an additional 2 degree C warming, let alone 1.5 degree C or lower warming limits that may be necessary to prevent rapid, non-linear warming, the Durban outcome may be seen as another tragic lost opportunity to put the world on a path that avoids dangerous climate change.

Given that the voluntary greenhouse gas emissions reductions agreed to at COP-16 in Cancun are expected to allow an additional 3.5 degree C warming and that significant greenhouse gas emissions reductions are necessary before 2020 to have any reasonable chance of limiting warming to 2 degrees C, the Durban deal can be seen as almost insuring dangerous warming unless nations agree to make further emissions reductions before 2020, the effective date of the new Durban deal. (For a discussion of the gap between voluntary emissions commitments, and emissions reductions needed to achieve a warming limit of 2 degrees C, see, Holme, et al, 2011)

Although the Durban deal included agreement to create a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, since Canada, Japan, and Russia joined the United States in announcing their unwillingness to accept new emissions reduction targets under an extended Kyoto framework, the Durban extension of Kyoto is not likely to produce significant reductions in the threat of climate change. It is notable, however, that some nations agreed to commit to a second commitment target under Kyoto despite the fact that most of the larger polluters refused to do so, thus recognizing that some nations seem to acknowledge that they must act on the basis of obligation to the planet and not only on the basis of self-interest alone.

Although Durban finalized many of the administrative details of a new mechanism to administer funds for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries, the Green Climate Fund, adequate, predictable, and additional financing at agreed upon levels has not yet materialized in UNFCCC climate negotiations.

III-An Ethical Analysis of Durban

To evaluate what happened in Durban it is necessary to have some understanding of prior negotiations leading up to Durban and in particular the UNFCCC COPs at Bali, Poznan, Copenhagen, and Cancun. This history is necessary to have some concrete understanding of the negotiating positions and their context that nations took coming into Durban and how this history reveals that most nations have been guided primarily by economic self-interest, not international responsibility.

Looking at the most recent COP before Durban, the 2010 Cancun COPs goals were modest in light of the failure of COP-15 in Copenhagen the year before to achieve an expected global solution to climate change. Copenhagen was expected to produce a global solution to climate change pursuant to a two-year negotiating process and agenda that was agreed to in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2007.

At the COP-13 negotiations in Bali, Indonesia in 2007, parties to the UNFCCC agreed to replace the Kyoto Protocol with an agreement that would create a new emissions reduction commitment period under the UNFCCC and would include binding emissions reductions for developed countries and new programs on adaptation for developing countries, deforestation, finance, technology transfer, and capacity building. This agreement was referred to as the Bali Roadmap, which also called for articulating a “shared vision for long-term cooperative action,” including a long-term global goal for emission reductions.

The original UNFCCC climate treaty had neither a quantified temperature limitation goal nor a ghg concentration atmospheric stabilization goal. In the Bali Roadmap the international community agreed to negotiate such a goal.

The Bali decision also recognized that developing countries could make contributions to solving the climate change through the development of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), meaning climate change strategies for developing countries. The NAMAs, however, would not constitute binding emissions reduction requirements for developing countries in contrast to the binding obligations of developed countries in the Kyoto Protocol that would be further developed and extended in Copenhagen.

Over the next few COPs, progress was made from the standpoint of the United States and several other developed countries, most notably when US President Obama in 2009 personally negotiated the Copenhagen Accords which were somewhat strengthened by the agreement reached in Cancun a year later in December of 2010. In Copenhagen, President Obama was successful most notably in getting all nations to identify voluntary emissions reductions commitments and getting key developing nations to agree to procedures to that would allow the international community to better verify these commitments. Yet, the US negotiated in Copenhagen, Cancun, and Durban as if it need not commit to reduce its emissions until other nations made commitments.

The United States approached negotiations in Durban as if the United States need not make binding emissions reductions commitments unless it could secure commitments to reduce GHG emissions from high-emitting countries including China and India that had no binding commitments under the Kyoto deal. For this reason, the US pushed for agreement to negotiate a new international agreement that would include all nations, a goal that was achieved in Durban.

In Copenhagen US President Obama led negotiations that appeared to be motivated, at least in large part, by what was politically feasible in the United States. In Copenhagen, Obama was clearly interested in getting China, India, Brazil,and South Africa to make commitments on climate change because the failure to get commitments from major developing countries would guarantee that no climate deal would get ratified by Congress. Most observers would agree that there was little chance of getting US congressional support for an international deal on climate change unless China and India and other high-emitting nations agreed to commitments. For this reason, Obama was focused on getting some developing nations to agree to voluntary emissions reductions, an outcome that he succeeded in accomplishing in Copenhagen. Yet, as we have explained in ClimateEthics before, no nation may deny its duty to reduce its emissions to its fair share of safe global emissions on the basis that others who are contributing to the harm have failed to cease harmful behavior. (Brown, 2009) This is so because no nation or person has a right to continue destructive behavior on the basis that others who are contributing to the harm have not ceased their destructive behavior.

And so what has been politically feasible on climate change in the United States is inconsistent with what ethics and justice would require of the United States. If this is the case, strong criticism of the United States is warranted as long as the US leadership is not advocating among its own people to support positions that ethics and justice would require of it.

The United States and several other countries have been acting in the last four COPs as if they need not commit to impose costs on themselves to reduce the threat of climate change as long as others refuse to commit because other nations who do not impose emissions constraints on themselves would benefit economically by being able to produce goods at lower costs than those who increase energy costs through adoption of climate policies. In other words, the United States has been consistently negotiating as if its economic interests trump its ethical obligations to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to the US fair share of safe global emissions.

As ClimateEthics has frequently explained, as a matter of justice no nation, including the United States, can refuse to reduce its emissions to its fair share of safe global emissions levels on the basis that others won’t act. Yet this is consistently what the United States and a few other nations have done. Making matters worse, the negotiations leading up to Durban beginning at the Poznan COP in 2008 have been plagued by the United States insistence that it would not agree to be bound to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, an agreement that the United States alone among the nations of the world refused to ratify largely because it did not contain emissions reductions commitments for developing nations. This US position ultimately made the negotiations much more complicated than they needed to be by insisting that negotiations continue under two tracks, one for the Kyoto parties and one that would ignore the Kyoto agreement and its architecture. In taking this position, the United States was communicating to the world it need not commit to emissions reductions until others so committed. And so one of the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases has consistently refused to reduce its emissions to its fair share of safe global emissions on the basis of national economic interest.

The United States and several other nations including Canada, Japan, and Russia have now refused to make a commitment in a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol on the basis that they need not commit to reduce greenhouse gas emission until other nations make equivalent commitments. Although the US has agreed to make voluntary reductions under the Cancun agreements, this was committed to on the basis that developing nations made voluntary commitments under Cancun also. (Brown, 2010a) Also, as we shall see, these voluntary commitments are inadequate to prevent dangerous climate change.

In examining previous COPs, ClimateEthics has proposed ethical criteria that any proposed post-Kyoto regime must meet at a minimum. (Brown, 2010 b) That is any post-Kyoto regime must:

• Require sufficient greenhouse emissions reductions to assure that the international community is on a greenhouse gas emissions reduction pathway that will prevent dangerous climate change harm. This is sometimes referred to as the environmental sufficiency criteria.
• Begin to base differences among national allocations on the basis of equity and justice. This is sometimes referred to as the equity criteria.
• Assure that those responsible for climate change provide adequate, predictable adaptation funding to enable developing countries and in particular the most vulnerable developing countries to do what is necessary to avoid climate change damages in cases where it is possible to take action and to prevent damages, or be compensated for climate change damages in cases where it is impossible to take protective action. We refer to this as the just adaptation criteria.

Although these three criteria, that is environmental sufficiency, equity, and just adaptation constitute the minimum ethical considerations that any climate regime must satisfy, they don’t capture all ethical questions raised by any proposed climate change regime. There are numerous other ethical questions raised by any proposed climate change regimes that go beyond these minimum requirements including issues of fair process, gender issues in policy formation, obligations of sub-national governments, organizations, businesses, and individuals for climate change, human rights issues relating to climate change and many more. This post, however, now looks at Durban in light of the three minimum criteria.

A. Environmental Sufficiency

Durban not only failed to produce an agreement that assures that the international community is on a greenhouse gas emissions reduction pathway that will prevent dangerous climate change harm, it deferred serious implementation of any new commitments in emissions reductions until 2020. Although Durban accomplished the laudable goal of getting all nations to negotiate an agreement with legal force, it did almost nothing to put the world on an emissions reduction pathway that had hope of preventing dangerous climate change. Although the Cancun COP the year before Durban did produce voluntary commitments from the most important developed and developing nations, these commitments leave at the very minimum a 5Gt gap between emissions levels that will be achieved if there is full compliance with the voluntary emissions reductions and what is necessary to prevent 2°C rise, a warming amount that most scientists believe could cause very dangerous climate change, and an amount that has been adopted as the ultimate goal of the UNFCCC. (See for a fuller discussion of this Brown, 2010) There is no reason to believe that future negotiations that were agreed to in Durban will overcome the unwillingness of nations to commit to emissions reductions that are necessary to prevent dangerous climate change. In Durban, the hard issues have simply been deferred to the future.

B. Equity Criteria

The second minimum ethical criteria that all post-Kyoto proposals must meet is the requirement that national emissions reduction proposals must be consistent with what “equity” and “justice” demands of nations. That is, equity requires that each nation reduce its emissions to its fair share of safe global emissions. And so, each nation’s emissions reduction levels should be based upon what distributive and retributive justice demands, not on national self-interest. Although there are different theories of distributive justice that lead to different national allocations, many justifications for national ghg emissions allocations voluntarily agreed to under Cancun fail to satisfy any ethical scrutiny. In other words, it is not necessary to know what perfect justice requires to conclude that some voluntary proposals for national ghg allocations under Cancun are unjust and Durban did nothing to change this. These issues have been deferred to future negotiations under Durban.

C. Just Adaptation Criteria

The third minimum ethical criteria for judging any second commitment period under the UNFCCC is that it must provide adequate funding to support adaptation programs in developing countries given that some developing countries have done nothing to cause climate change and must take steps to avoid harsh impacts The Durban agreement did manage to create an Green Climate Fund that will be the financial mechanism to manage adaptation funding and also made some progress on a few other adaptation issues. Yet Durban failed to identify dedicated sources of funding to implement an adaptation agenda that is based upon “mandatory” contributions to “new”, “predictable,” and “additional” sources of funding. Therefore Durban failed to satisfy the ethical criteria for adequate funding for adaptation.

IV Conclusion

To adjudicate the disagreement about whether Durban was a disaster or a meaningful step forward, one must look at Durban’s resolution of the major issues needed to get the world on a reasonably hopeful path that would avoid dangerous climate change, whether nations are agreeing to commit to their fair share of safe global emissions, and whether mechanisms for needed adaptation are in place. Under these criteria, Durban was a huge failure.

It is true, that given what was deemed to be politically possible going into Durban, Durban achieved some important progress. Yet identifying this progress, without recognition of the magnitude and seriousness of the overall failures obscures the message that most needs to communicated to citizens, namely that most nations are failing to live up to their global obligations and this puts tens if not hundreds of millions of people and the resources on which life depends at great risk.

To rectify the failure of nations to take their ethical obligations seriously, strategies need to be developed that turn up the volume on the ethical obligations of nations on climate change. At the top of the list, is a strategy that would require nations to make their positions on major ethical issues entailed by climate change explicit so that they can be reflected on by citizens around the world. ClimateEthics will make more detailed recommendations on how to implement this strategy in an upcoming post.

There is a need to make national positions on climate change’s major ethical issues explicit because nations are frequently taking positions on climate change that are obviously deeply ethically flawed, but citizens around the world or the press have no way of commenting on these positions without speculating on the justification for the national position. Requiring nations to expressly identify their positions on such issues as what is their fair share of safe global emissions would allow critical reflection on what each nation’s position is on a safe global atmospheric concentration stabilization level, given that atmospheric target what that nation believes is an acceptable global emissions reduction pathway to achieve the atmospheric target, what is that nation’s position on its equitable share of future global emissions that will achieve the needed emissions reductions pathway, as well as their ethical justification for all of these issues.

Although nations are likely to continue to resist committing to emissions reductions consistent with what ethics would require of them, making national positions on these issues explicit would create an opportunity to exert global pressure on the most irresponsible nations.

References:

Brown, Donald, 2011, Ten Practical Policy Consequences of Acknowledging That Climate Change Is An Ethical Problem, ClimateEthics.org. http://rockblogs.psu.edu/climate/2011/08/ten-practical-policy-consequences-of-acknowledging-that-climate-change-is-an-ethical-problem.html

Brown, Donald, 2010, An Ethical Analysis of the Cancun Climate Negotiations Outcome, ClimateEthics.org, http://rockblogs.psu.edu/climate/2010/12/an-ethical-analysis-of-the-cancun-climate-negotiations-outcome.html

Brown, Donald, 2010b, A Comprehensive Ethical Analysis of the Copenhagen Accord. ClimateEthics.org, http://rockblogs.psu.edu/climate/2010/01/a-comprehensive-ethical-analysis-of-the-copenhagen-accord.html

Brown, Donald, 2009, The Strong Scottish Moral Leadership On Climate Change Compared To The Absence Of Any Acknowledged Ethical Duty In The US Debate ClimateEthics.org, http://rockblogs.psu.edu/climate/2009/08/the-strong-scottish-moral-leadership-on-climate-change-compared-to-the-absence-of-any-acknowledged-ethical-duty-in-the-us-debate.html

Hertzgaard, Mark, 2011, Durban, Where the Climate Deniers-in-Chief Ran the Show, The Nation, http://www.thenation.com/article/165155/durban-where-climate-deniers-chief-ran-show/

Holme, N, et al, 2011, Negotiations Heading toward a High, High Cost Pathway, 1.50C, http://climateactiontracker.org/assets/CAT_Durban_update_2011_2.pdf

Light, Andrew, 2011, Why Durban Matters, Center For American Progress, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/12/why_durban_matters.html

UNFCCC, 2011a, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on t he Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Draft decision-/CP.17, http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/cop17_durbanplatform.pdf

UNFCCC, 2011b, Green Climate Fund-Report of the Transitional Committee, Draft decision-CP.17, http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/cop17_gcf.pdf

UNFCCC, 2011c, Durban decisions are available at http://unfccc.int/2860.php/

The official package deal of Durban consisted of 4 main documents, apart of several other decisions, most of them less critical, that have been adopted:

1. A decision on the second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol 
2. The LCA outcome: the partial implementation of the Bali Action Plan and the Cancun Agreements
3. A Durban Platform for Enhanced Action: the decision to work towards a new “agreed outcome with legal force, applicable to all”
4. The green climate fund

The package was officially sold to the world as an exit, but having a closer look, it’s asy to see it doesn’t do what it is suposed to do, and it does what it shouldn’t do.

Rather then having a look decision by decision, let’s have an overall look on what the “package”implies:

Postponing the urgent

Climate scientists are advising us insistently: the world just has a few years to start acting on climate change, if not we may enter in an irreversible spiral of climate disaster. So the most urgent issue is to start acting NOW on real mitigation.

Unfortunately, the Durban package doesn’t attend this at all. During the whole Durban negotiation, there hasn’t even been a real discussion on the issue.

Mid term reduction targets

The reduction pledges by developed countries that are on the table, are still the same, totally insufficient, 13-17% reduction rates (from 1990 levels) since Copenhagen. Increasing the ambition is again postponed indefinitely. Inscribing those pledges in a legally binding Kyoto Protocol doesn’t change anything to the fact that those pledges will cook the world.

But, the Durban package - despite announcing the contrary – didn’t even adopt the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. It just ‘took note” of the “proposed amendments” to do so. The actual decision is postponed until next year. (More extensive analysis on this here)

Even developing countries pledged to do more than developed, but lack the financial and technological means to go beyond what they promised already.

Long term reduction goal

The other issue that is postponed since Copenhagen, and once again forwarded to discussions for next year, is the global goal. That is to say, how much should the world reduce its emissions by 2050? This longer term targets are essential if we want to stabilize the climate. Planning for it now is indispensable. But the numbers aren’t even being discussed.

Of course, it is a very difficult discussion. Several important aspects determine it:

• The carbon budget: a scientific concept that calculates how many emissions the world can afford to do, without surpassing dangerous limits. Unfortunately, most countries don’t see even the relevance of the concept.
• How this budget, and thus the atmospheric space, is going to be divided, essentially between developed and developing countries, but also within those groups of countries
• In order to decide how to share the burden, a set of criteria for the division of responsibilities has to be decided upon. Some key criteria should be: equity, population, historical emissions. But, developed countries don’t even want to talk about such criteria.

So, without criteria for division of the burden, nobody actually wants to talk on the mitigation necessity. But, we can’t negotiate the carbon budget with Mother Earth: if we trespass it, she will act on us!

Again, the world is left waiting for the real answers, while the questions at stake become more urgent year after year.

Throwing away the valuable

Two basic principles, most valuable, embedded in the climate change convention, have always led the work up till know: the Science Principle, and the Equity Principle, which is known in negotiators jargon as “Common But Differentiated Responsabilities”. Both are being thrown away.

Of course, nobody says the science principle will be disregarded. Indeed, there are several references to science and to the work of the IPCC, in the different texts. But was is the use of stating “keeping in mind science, I will do just the opposite science is requiering”? And that’s exactly what this decisions are doing. There no link between the mitigation targets and the scientific requirements. But worse, we are now openly accepting that during the whole decade, this link won’t be made. It is the reign of the “voluntary pledges”, at least up till 2020.

Also equity is totally being undermined. An agreement to start negotiating an “agreed outcome with legal force” (probably a new Protocol), is forced upon developing countries, with the clear addition that it will be “applicable to all”. This contrasts strongly with all the previous decisions about climate change, which were always placed in the context of the ‘Common But Differentiated Responsabilities’.  The agreement to negotiate a new legal outcome not only omits all references to it, it has been consciously taken out. Someone tweeted from the final plenary that the principle US negotiator reportedly said: “if equity is in, then the US is out”. It seems the US’ wishes are being considered as the future of the new climate regime.

In the new climate regime, it seems the same legal commitment is being demanded from those who emit least as from those who emit most.

Boosting the bad

Up till the moment, existing carbon markets have proven to be the worse idea for environment and equity. Just some elements out of long list fairly long list of why carbon markets don’t work: the essentially trespass emission rights from poorer countries (with low emissions per capita and needs to grow in order to lift population out of poverty)  to richer countries (with high per capita emissions and desires of not diminishing their unsustainable lifestyle). By doing so, the originally projected emission growth in developing countries is locked in: or the emissions will take place in the developing country, or through offsets, in the developed.

Worse is that there are so many problems with baselines, with projects that count for offsets but are not additional, with other environmental or human rights impacts, that carbon markets are regarded the biggest non-solution for the climate, and a collective lie to the public which is being told that in this way something is done.

But, the bad plans always seem to have priority, and the carbon markets are high on the agenda of most governments. Before the conference, one could hear a lot more worry from the governments and corporations side on “positive signals for the carbon markets”, than on “improving the level of ambition.” One of the main reasons the Kyoto Protocol hasn’t been killed completely, is precisely that this was necessary for the stability of carbon markets, especially the European system.

So, despite the abundant critiques on existing carbon markets, they have been  strengthened a lot through the Durban decisions. There has been a strong impulse for them in four areas:

1) In the “proposed amendment” on the KP, carbon markets are opened up for all parties, even for those that will not be a member of the second commitment period. Furthermore, the door is opened for “any new kind of market mechanism to be established under the convention” to be valid under the Kyoto scheme.

2) A separate discussion was made to include Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in the Clean Development Mechanisms. This technique provides the illusion that we can keep emitting, as the gases will be stored later on, while in fact their storage is at high danger to escape again to the atmosphere at some point of time. At the same time, the market units based on CCS will give more emission rights to those buying the offsets.

3) In the text on LCA, markets are now definitely approved as an answer to deforestation and degradation of forests. (art 66). This is problematic in several ways:

* Only those who were used to deforest before, will now be compensated for not doing so!
* As previous deforestation emissions are the baseline for offsetting units, which are essentially the transfer of emission rights, the previous emission rates will be just transferred to those buying the offsets.
* The finance will only arrive after the results are proven, so, after several years! In the mean time, there are no funds to implement the policies that will lead to the reduced deforestation. As carbon market prices are very volatile, and with a severe tendency to crash, the final payment is not even secure.

4) There is a specific chapter (1bv) that now “defines a new market-based mechanism”, and establishes a work program to further implement them. This is a ball, that once it starts rolling, is very difficult to stop. The direction is a proliferation of all kinds of new market mechanisms.

(*) Nele Marien is environmental politics analyst. She was negotiator for the Bolivian Climate Change team from 2009 till November 2011
Original text: http://www.nelemarien.info/durban_not_success/

(December 14, 2011) The Climate Change Conference ended two days later than expected, adopting a set of decisions that were known only a few hours before their adoption. Some decisions were even not complete at the moment of their consideration. Paragraphs were missing and some delegations didn’t even have copies of these drafts. The package of decisions was released by the South African presidency with the ultimatum of “Take it or leave it”. Only the European Union was allowed to make last minute amendments at the plenary.

Several delegations made harsh criticisms to the documents and expressed their opposition to sections of them. However, no delegation explicitly objected the subsequent adoption of these decisions. At the end, the whole package was adopted by consensus without the objection of any delegation. The core elements of the Durban Package can be summarized as follows:

1)     A Zombie called Kyoto Protocol

• A soulless undead: The promises of reducing greenhouse gas emission for the second period of commitments of the Kyoto Protocol represent less than half of what is necessary to keep the temperature increase below 2°C.
• This Zombie (second period of the Kyoto Protocol) will only finally go into effect next year (COP 18).
• It is not known if the second period of the Kyoto Protocol will cover 5 or 8 years.
• United States, Canada, Japan, Russia, Australia and New Zealand will be out of this second period of the Kyoto Protocol.
• This will be known as the lost decade in the fight against climate change.

2)     New regime of “Laisser Faire, Laisser Faisser”

• In 2020 a new legal instrument will come into effect that will replace the Kyoto Protocol and will seriously impact the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
• The core elements of this new legal instrument can be already seen due to the results of the negotiations: a) voluntary promises rather than binding commitments to reduce emissions, b) more flexibilities (carbon markets) for developed countries to meet their emission reduction promises, and c) an even weaker compliance mechanism than the Kyoto Protocol.
• The new legal instrument will cover all the States, effectively removing the difference between developing and developed countries. The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” already established in the Climate Change Convention will disappear.
• The result will be the deepening of the “Laisser Faire, laisser passer” regime inaugurated in Copenhagen, Cancun and Durban which will lead to an increase in temperature of more than 4°C.

3)     A Green Fund with no funds

• The Green Fund now has an institutional structure in which the World Bank is a key player.
• The 100 billion is only a promise and will NOT be provided for by the developed countries.
• The money will come from the carbon markets (which are collapsing), from private investments, from credits (to be paid) and from the developing countries themselves.

4)     A lifesaver for the Carbon Markets

• The existing carbon markets will live regardless of the fate of the Kyoto Protocol.
• Also, new carbon market mechanisms will be created to meet the emissions reduction pledges of this decade.
• It is a desperate attempt to avoid the loss of the carbon markets, which are collapsing due to the fall of the carbon credits, from 30 Euros per ton to 3 Euros per ton of CO2.
• Developed countries will reduce less than what they promise because they will buy Emission Reduction Certificates from developing countries.

5)     REDD: a perverse incentive to deforest in this decade

• If you don’t cut down trees you won’t be able to issue certificates of reduction of deforestation when the REDD (Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) mechanism comes into operation.
• CONSEQUENCES: deforest now if you want to be ready for REDD.
• The safeguards for indigenous peoples will be flexible and discretionary for each country.
• The offer of funding for forests is postponed until the next decade due to the fact that demand for Carbon Credits will not increase until then because of the low emission reduction promises.

ĄAmandla! ĄJallalla!

In the actions and events of the social movements in Durban, two battle cries emerged: “Amandla” and “Jallalla”. The first one is a Xhosa and Zulu word from South Africa which means “power”. The second word is an expression in aymara which means “for life”. “ĄAmandlaĄ °Jallalla!” means “ĄPower for life!”

This is the “power for life” that we must build, that transcends borders, from our communities, neighborhoods, workplaces and place of study in order to stop this ongoing genocide and ecocide.

(*) Pablo Solón, international analyst and social activist. United Nations Ambassador and Chief Climate Change Negotiator from the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

http://pablosolon.wordpress.com/2011/12/16/the-durban-package-laisser-faire-laisser-passer/

Late morning of Saturday, 10 December (as the Durban climate talks were extended beyond Friday), the Chair of the AWGLCA, Mr. Daniel Reifsnyder of the United States, made available to Parties his draft conclusions on the outcome of the work of the Working Group which comprised 56 pages including annexes.

When the AWGLCA met for its final plenary session late evening the same day, Reifsnyder formally presented the document to Parties (referred to as document L4). He also presented another document reflecting the work undertaken in the informal groups as a note by him, (referred to as Conference Room Paper – CRP 39), which he said was to carry forward ideas and proposals in areas in which continued discussions are envisaged next year.

Many concerns raised especially by developing countries during the final session of the AWGLCA were brushed aside with the unusual procedure of transmitting the outcome document to the COP under the authority of the Chair despite it not enjoying any consensus from the UNFCCC Parties.

Several developing countries raised concerns over many specific issues and the lack of balance in the text, especially in relation to mitigation actions of developed and developing countries, with the breaking down of the firewall between them, and the absence of the recognition of historical responsibility and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).

Many countries were unhappy that there was no expression of the level of mitigation ambition needed by developed countries and there was no provision for the comparability of efforts between the Kyoto Protocol (KP) Parties and the non-KP Parties (the US in particular). Some expressed deep concern that a flexible mitigation regime for developed countries was being set up in place of the KP, and that it did not have any compliance regime or common accounting framework.

The US was opposed to any attempt in Durban to have any process to review its pledge or on how to raise the ambition level of greenhouse gases emissions reduction. It also did not want a common accounting framework or a compliance regime, which was called for by many developing countries and the European Union.

There were concerns also over long-term finance where there was no clarity on how the US$100 billion per year by 2020 as agreed to in Cancun was going to be mobilized or for a roadmap for that to be put in place to ensure predictable and sustainable financial resources to developing countries.

Some developing countries wanted the AWGLCA document to be worked on further to “restore the balance” and proposed that this be done next year and were not ready to support the adoption of the outcome document in Durban.

The life of the AWGLCA was extended for another year through a decision by Parties in the “Durban Platform” document which reads as follows:

“Decides to extend the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention for one year in order for it to continue its work and reach the agreed outcome pursuant to decision 1/CP.13 (Bali Action Plan) through decisions adopted by the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth sessions of the Conference of the Parties, at which time the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention shall be terminated”.

The request to carry on further work on the L4 document next year was ignored by the Chair who proceeded to transmit the document to the COP under his own authority.

There was deep frustration among many delegations. The Venezuelan climate envoy, Ms. Claudia Salerno had to stand on the chair with her country’s name plate to draw the attention of the AWGLCA Chair after he had gaveled the adoption of the report of the meeting.

Salerno said that the AWGLCA document had serious deficiencies. Yet, it was being transmitted to the COP. She disclosed that there were threats that if Venezuela did not agree to the adoption of the text, there would be no second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and that the multilateral system would not be preserved.

The Chair just ignored Venezuela’s protest and adjourned the meeting.

At the formal session of the COP plenary, Reifsnyder informed the COP that Parties were not able to reach consensus. The text, he said, was rich and comprehensive and harvested important progress. He hoped that it could be adopted by the COP as part of the comprehensive Durban package. The document was adopted as part of the Durban package.

(The package comprises 4 decisions on: (i) the second commitment period for emissions reductions by Annex 1 Parties under the KP; (ii) a decision on the work of the AWGLCA; (iii) a decision on the Green Climate Fund; and (iv) an agreement that establishes a new ad hoc working group on the Durban Platform for enhanced action.)

When the AWGLCA document was first presented to Parties, many concerns were raised.

Saudi Arabia expressed its concerns in a number of areas. The text puts more emphasis on the mitigation elements for developing countries and weakens those for developing countries. For example, on the modalities on international assessment and review (IAR) of developed countries, the need for unified accounting rules is no longer in the text. (Several countries, both developed and developing countries had called for common accounting rules for developed country mitigation but the US was opposed to this).

In the case of biennial update reports (BUR) for developing countries, the mandate from the  (2010) Cancun decision was for such reports to be submitted consistent with their capabilities and the level of support provided for reporting [paragraph 60(c) of the Cancun decision] but the language in paragraph 41(f) of the AWGLCA document (L4) does not reflect that.

[Paragraph 41(f) states: “That non-Annex 1 (developing country) Parties shall submit a biennial update report every two years, either as a summary of parts of their national communications…”]

Saudi Arabia said that there was no link to the capabilities and national circumstances (of developing countries), nor is there any reference to the level of financial support.

It did not see the Chair giving the same treatment on issues in trying to become more ambitious, referring to the issue of ‘economic and social consequences of response measures’. In the Cancun decision, Parties agreed to strive to implement policies and measures to respond to climate change in such a way so as to avoid negative social and economic consequences. The language in the document now urges Parties to give full consideration to the positive and negative impacts of the implementation of response measures which is a downgrading of the Cancun decision. It also attempts to put together some considerations of other issues which go beyond the scope of the AWGLCA.

On finance, Saudi Arabia asked how the Standing Committee under the COP could just be an advisory group. On long-term finance, in relation to mobilizing climate finance, the AWGLCA document (in paragraph 125) refers to assessment criteria in “the report on mobilizing climate finance for the G20”. This (referring to the UNFCCC) is not a G20 forum.

Saudi Arabia said there were many examples apart from these concerns that show that more work was needed on the document as it was presented for the first time in the morning (of Saturday). It reiterated the need for further work on the document before it could be adopted and was flexible on the process on how to deal with concerns raised.

Malaysia said that the approach advanced by the Chair was to defer all issues in the CRP 39 document to next year as these issues were controversial with divergent views, which developed countries and some developing countries were opposed to. These related to issues such as intellectual property rights, unilateral trade measures, equity in the shared vision document are some examples. However, in the AWGLCA L4 document, in cases where developing countries had strong views, their proposals have been ignored especially in relation to the mitigation of developed countries, on cooperative sectoral approaches, various approaches including opportunities for using markets, and economic and social consequences of response measures.

The texts in relation to these aspects reflected the proposals of developed countries and do not reflect the positions of several developing countries. In the case of mitigation by developed countries, there are no numbers on the need for the aggregate emission reductions target for Annex 1 (developed country) Parties as called for by some developing countries. This is a problem as the ambition level of the Annex 1 Parties is completely missing. There is only a reference in the preambular section “acknowledging that there is a gap between the aggregate level of reduction to be achieved through global mitigation efforts.”  Hence, the attempt here is to avoid any Annex 1 aggregate number but to make it a responsibility of all Parties (including developing countries) to meet the mitigation gap.

The issue of comparability of efforts needed among developed countries between those who are KP Parties and those who are not, which was in paragraph 1(b)(i) of the Bali Action Plan (mandate for the AWGLCA) is really missing with only a weak reference in the preamble about recalling in relation to the comparability of mitigation efforts. In reference to the compliance of developed countries, there is reference in the IAR section but is very weak as it says that “… any revision of the modalities and procedures for IAR and review should take into account any future agreement on a compliance regime for mitigation targets…” This really undermines the existing KP compliance system and puts in place a much weaker regime which is to be negotiated in a future agreement. This is completely unacceptable and allows for a weak mitigation regime for Annex 1 Parties and provides for the “great escape” from the KP.

Malaysia said that to make matters worse, the text has in effect made a decision for new market based mechanisms under “various approaches” when this was an issue of controversy. Instead of this issue being deferred for consideration to next year in the absence of agreement in the informal group, the text calls for new market mechanisms.

Further, on the issue of cooperative sectoral approaches it was concerned that the proposals of developed countries have been taken on board while concerns of developing countries have not been reflected.

In the circumstances, Malaysia could not accept the L4 document as a balanced text and wanted the document not to be adopted but to be transmitted for further work under the AWGLCA next year, along with CRP 39.

The Democratic Republic of Congo for the African Group was concerned that on mitigation of developed countries, Parties were merely noting and clarifying pledges with no clear process for raising ambition or ensuring comparability of efforts. The decision should go beyond merely urging countries to do more. This view is held by many including for those Annex 1 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol. There was an apparent lack of balanced text on the mitigation of developed countries and that of developing countries. When reading the text, one wonders if it was for developed countries or developing countries and it does not reflect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).

On long-term finance, there is no clear level of commitment for financing when the so-called fast start finance ends (in 2012). The text had strong obligations for developing countries without similar appropriate provisions for developed country mitigation. The text does not reflect that balance as contained in the Convention.

Thailand also raised concerns over the mitigation chapter and said that there was no number for the aggregate emission reductions needed by developed countries and the ambition level was missing. There was no strong text on the need for comparability of efforts among developed countries who were Parties to the KP and those who were not. It was unhappy that a strong compliance regime was absent and found the document unacceptable and called for further work at the next session of the AWGLCA.

The Philippines said it had difficulties with the output of work. There was grave imbalance in the text in relation to adaptation. Adaptation has been regarded a poor cousin of mitigation. Securing resources for adaptation appeared to be a distant reality. It said there was opposition to linking adaptation to finance. This was a process of give and take but developing countries have been giving and giving. On the issue of long term finance, the language is very weak in relation to the scaling up of resources.

India said it shared the concerns raised by developing countries. Two issues of concern for India were on agricultural emissions and trade. It said that detailed discussions took place on views within the scope of mitigation in agriculture as this sector involved the livelihood of millions of people in terms of employment and was not merely an issue of CBDR. The agriculture sector still depended on monsoons and was vulnerable to climate change and is excluded from India’s mitigation targets. The agriculture issue in the document is not mature enough to receive a direction for a decision at COP 18 (in 2013). It wanted this excluded from the text.

On the issue of trade, India said that this was left out of the section on ‘economic and social consequences of response measures’ when there were 3 options from developing countries with one option having the support of about 80 countries. This issue was fundamental and further work needs to take place next year as contained in the document CRP 39 for elaboration.

The AWGLCA Chair confirmed that this issue was still on the table and will be forwarded for further work next year.

Pakistan said while there was good work done, progress had not been made to complete the work (of the AWGLCA). As regards the Adaptation Committee, it said that the Committee should have been given the right status as a subsidiary body of the Convention with more prominence. It expressed sadness that there was no consensus in this regard.

On the Standing Committee on finance, the Committee should have had a strong oversight mandate.  On long-term finance, it was sad that Parties were not able to achieve anything as there was need for a common understanding on how to scale up adequate and predictable resources.

On mitigation, the document was definitely skewed heavily against developing countries and blurring the distinction between developed and developing country obligations. There was need to insert the notion of national circumstances in relation to the submission of BURs and there was no link to finance. Pakistan said that it was at a loss on how the process was going to unfold and would like to see a way to work further.

Venezuela said that the process has downgraded the level of ambition in relation to mitigation and the text was seriously imbalanced. It did not see how the clarification and understanding of the emission reduction pledges of developed countries will serve to improve the trust and confidence in Parties when there is no real ambition in the mitigation targets. The delicate balance between the mitigation of developed and developing countries was crossed when the principle of CBDR has been taken out of the text. There has been a redistribution of responsibilities and the commitments of developing countries are higher than that asked of developed countries. The world appeared upside down and this was not acceptable.

On ‘market mechanisms’ there was reference in the text to “building upon the existing flexibility mechanisms established under the KP” and Venezuela was concerned if there would indeed be a second commitment period under the KP. It did not want a link on the use of markets and the undertaking of mitigation actions.

Venezuela was concerned that once again, Parties were in a take-it-or-leave-it situation (as regards the text), which was given in the morning. There was frustration and fatigue and Parties do not have to accept anything just because it was late and people are tired. This (L4) document was not ambitious enough and there was need to address what the planet needs. It could not accept a document that suits just one country (in an apparent reference to the US for not wanting the level of ambition in mitigation for developed countries to be in the text).

Referring to the Durban package, where Parties potentially lose the KP due to a lack of ambition, it did not believe that the document could be taken seriously as the basis of a future legally binding regime with pledges, flexibilities and market mechanisms to serve a few. It wanted the Chair to tell Parties how to move responsibly to resolve the issues.

Egypt also had concerns over long-term finance as there was need for predictable and sustainable support to enable developing countries to undertake mitigation and adaptation actions. The deal was not done in terms of long-term finance and there was need for further elaboration on the needs of developing countries and on the sources of finance. The Bali Action Plan work was not complete.

Gambia, for the Least Developed Countries said a decision on long-term finance was not reflected in the text. However, it was prepared for the Durban package to be adopted.

China shared the concerns raised by other developing countries. It said that the work of the AWGLCA was not expressed in a balanced manner especially that of the mitigation commitments of developed countries as compared to that of developing countries. There is no reflection of historical responsibility and the level of mitigation targets needed. On long-term finance, it was also concerned that there is no clear vision and provision for how the US$100 billion per year by 2020 was going to be achieved as agreed to in Cancun. No means have been provided in the text to do this. This question needs further discussion.

Saying that this was not the last meeting of the AWGLCA, China added that Parties will need to continue to make efforts to reach the outcome of expectations under the Bali Roadmap (the Bali Action Plan and the determination of the second commitment period under the KP). The important questions were what the next steps are and how to make the arrangements.

China asked the Chair to make clear recommendations to the COP on the need for clear arrangements for the work of the AWGLCA since this has not been made clear and many issues under the Bali Roadmap need solutions. On the (L4) document, China said that concerns have been expressed and there was need to decide how to handle this. It asked how the document was going to be submitted to the COP when it did not fulfill the expectations of Parties and was far from being comprehensive and balanced.

Bolivia also expressed concerns over the lack of balance in the text, as the responsibility of undertaking mitigation efforts was falling on the shoulders of developing countries. As some countries were withdrawing from their commitments under the second commitment period of the KP, a weak and flexible regime was being put in place with no compliance regime. The pledges of Parties are not yet commitments and were unfair to those Annex 1 Parties who remain in the KP and who are upholding the instruments and the KP systems.

It expressed regret that the obligations of developing countries to do their national communications (reporting every four years), the BURs and participation in the registry were all expected with their own resources.

Bolivia said the principle of CBDR is not expressed in the text. It was also concerned that the text was opening the door to market mechanisms, which needed further analysis on the impacts of such mechanisms. It said that the document was not balanced and could not be adopted as it is but could be part of the discussions next year and wanted its concerns recorded.

Nicaragua said that the AWGLCA document on long-term finance was all about undertaking further studies on options for the mobilization of resources. There was no roadmap for the mobilization of the US$100 billion per year by 2020. It said that some Parties were proposing no resources during this decade. The Green Climate Fund has been created but it was a Fund with no funds. There is no definition on the sources of finance and it was concerned with references to the G20 report on mobilizing finance when that was an ad hoc forum.

Nicaragua advanced the idea of the use of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) for climate finance. It said that in 2009, the G20 proposed the issuance of US$ 250 billion in SDRs of which US$100 billion was for developed countries.  The International Monetary Fund was responsible for its issuance and this was done with great speed. If such resources could be used to save the banking system, it asked why this was not possible to save mother earth.

Ecuador said that on long term finance, it had made a proposal on the issuance of Special Drawing Rights. It also had proposed financial transaction taxes as well as taxes on imports of oil which could provide the sources for financing. It expressed regret that these proposals were not reflected in the document and there was a lack of consistency in the approach. It asked the Chair to find solutions that did not cross redlines.

Paraguay expressed concerns that the principles of historical responsibility and CBDR should not be diluted. It called for the completion of the Bali Roadmap.

Kenya said that the text fell short for Africa and was weak in adaptation and low on ambition in mitigation. It also stressed the importance of comparability of efforts among developed country Parties and the need to reflect a common accounting framework. The submissions of BURs by developing countries needed support and flexibility in reporting. It called for further improvement to the document before its adoption.

Bangladesh said that the text was watered down and crossed some redlines of the LDCs but it was prepared to accept the text with reservations. It said that the Adaptation Committee was a good way forward.

The European Union said it was disappointed with the AWGLCA document as it had weak language on the (emissions reduction) ambition gap and wanted a process to address this but this was not reflected in the document. The BUR guidelines for developing countries were not strong enough. Nevertheless, it did not want to run the risk of re-opening the balance reached in the document and supported its adoption.

Switzerland said that the document was insufficient in a number of chapters. On ‘shared vision’, it was blind. The paragraphs on ambition level and guidelines for reporting are insufficient. The text on international consultations and analysis (ICA) in relation to developing countries was weak. However, it was prepared to accept the document. The text is something Parties must continue with and develop it further.

The United States said that the negotiations were difficult and Parties needed to move forward on what was achieved and supported the adoption of the text. It said that the guidelines on transparency for the targets and actions were not perfect but if there was delay, Parties would be reneging on the Cancun decision and would unravel the Durban package which was significant.

Japan said that the document was not perfect but was a compromise that it could agree to and called for its adoption in its entirety.

Following the reactions of Parties, the Chair of the AWGLCA said that his sense was that there was a great deal of disappointment with the text. A number of Parties were against the adoption of the document and wanted it forwarded for further work next year. Despite this, he was going to forward the document to the COP with a recommendation for its adoption under his own authority.

He asked Parties to consider the report of the meeting of the AWGLCA for adoption and quickly gaveled, not recognizing Venezuela who had asked for the floor before the gavel.

Venezuela’s Special Envoy for climate change, Ms. Claudia Salerno, had to stand on her chair to get the attention of the Chair when her repeated waving of her country plaque was to no avail.  She said that she had asked for the floor before the gavel came down. Salerno said that the AWGLCA document had serious deficiencies. Yet it was being transmitted to the COP. She disclosed that there were threats that if Venezuela did not agree to the adoption of the text, there would be no second commitment period under the KP and that the multilateral system would not be preserved.

The climate envoy said that such threats were supporting a weak regime which threatens the world through a flexible system with no rules for mitigation and for developed countries to make pledges as they want and do as they want and when they want.

Referring to the goal of mobilizing US$100 billion for climate finance and (developed countries) using this as a bargaining chip, the Venezuelan envoy said that there could be no price for the our future and that of our children. She said that the farce has to stop and there must be an end to a bad agreement.

Despite the strong reaction from Venezuela, the Chair of the AWGLCA simply adjourned the meeting.

When the final formal plenary session of the Conference of Parties convened early morning of Sunday, the Chair of the AWGLCA reported that during the AWGLCA session held earlier, Parties exchanged views and many expressed support for the outcome of the work of the AWGLCA as contained in the L4 document, while others said that the document did not have balance. Parties were not able to reach consensus. The text, he said was rich and comprehensive and harvested important progress. He hoped that it could be adopted by the COP as part of the comprehensive Durban package.

The AWGLCA outcome was adopted a part of the Durban package.

On 8 December the facilitator Mr. Giza Gaspar Martins of Angola reported at the informal group and said that there was no new text because he needed to hear from the Parties on how to best reflect the divergence of views. However Parties expressed their desire for text that reflected their views.

The European Union stated that there are two main issues; whether to establish a new market-based mechanism or not and the issue of developing a framework. With regards to a new mechanism the EU outlined three options: agree to establish one now, don’t establish one or postpone the decision and have a work programme.  With regards to the framework they are divergent views on whether the framework would be rule based or loose and linked to a common accounting system or Parties can do as they choose. EU expressed that it wants a rule-based system and a wider accounting framework. The three options that apply to a new mechanism also apply to the framework.

Papua New Guinea asked the facilitator to clarify what the outcome of the session would be. He responded by saying that the comments will inform the report to the chair. The chair can then decide when and how the discussions continue.

Japan stated that approaches are needed to enhance cost-effectiveness and mitigation. Countries should be able to make their own approaches and apply their own standards. It further said that common ground had emerged and that it submitted text to make a new option with a work programme to allow discussions to continue so that understanding of what type of mechanism will be developed. Japan stated it has support from other Parties.

Switzerland, speaking on behalf of the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), stated that it wants to ensure environmental integrity and flexibility. There have been several iterations of the text that have weakened the application of standards to various approaches. Originally the text called for common rules and guidance, then assessed common standards and finally voluntary use of standards that may have no commonality. Switzerland further stated that it does not want a straight jacket that regulates the smallest details, but a compromise solution to have the greatest flexibility with a common framework that is developed. Certain countries state that it is premature to have standards, but approaches are being developed anyway. The EIG finds that the draft text of option 1 from the 6 December 17.30 text presents a balanced compromise and asked Parties to reconsider the situation so that a draft text can be forwarded to ministers that ensures environmental integrity and mitigation, as well as a work programme and no decision option.

China stated that it has a positive attitude toward mechanisms that shall be based on common rules in order to compare efforts of developed countries. But on this issue there are divergent views. China reiterated that there cannot be bottom up approaches without common rules and that a process is needed to discuss issues. It also suggested that no decision at this time may be appropriate so that the big picture is clearer.

Papua New Guinea stated that any text forwarded to the AWG-LCA Chair should be seen and endorsed by Parties beforehand.  It also endorsed the EIG’s proposal of working with an earlier version of the text , a no decision option and a third option which begins with paragraph 4 from option 1. It also stressed that it wants a rule-based approach that is flexible.

Brazil stated that it prefers an option of continuing consideration. It is currently not prepared to accept the establishment of mechanisms as relevant issues need to be discussed including consideration of common standards.

Australia stated the importance of markets in reducing emissions and the necessity of deep and liquid markets. It also said that there is much that Parties agree on including a new mechanism for developed and developing countries.

The United States was disappointed that there is not a revised text and concurred with the EU, Brazil and China regarding the options.  It would like to see a text for the ministers that lays out options.  The US also said that it needs a system that reflects sub-national programs from the US, but is not ready to determine how its program is connected to other mitigation options.

Grenada, speaking on behalf of AOSIS, stated that common standards must first be established to develop a new mechanism, there must be eligibility requirements including the acceptance of targets under the Kyoto Protocol, supplementarity and share of proceeds.

South Africa sated that there has been progress in the past year and Parties are close to reaching common ground.  It likes the text of 6 December 17.30 although work is still needed on supplementarity, governance and equitable access. It also said that the use of mechanisms is conditional on a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and comparable QELROs (quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives).  South Africa stated that it would like to discuss principles and standards over the next year with a clear work programme with a view to establish a new mechanism.

New Zealand stated that a market needs to be credible and flexible. It is essential to discuss frameworks, rule standards. While there are divergent views on the latter, it should be possible to move on the first and suggested a work programme for both. It challenged Parties to go for something greater than a least common denominator text. It also supported the call for an options paper with the establishment of a new mechanism and consideration of a framework, work programmes for both and a no decision option.

Bolivia stated that it has serious concerns regarding various aspects of markets and that virtually any mechanism can be approved.  It doesn’t understand how a new mechanism can be created when countries are not willing to agree to a legally binding mechanism.  Various approaches should be discussed, but we are only focusing on one and stated that option 4 (no decision) from Panama’s text is its preference.

Saudi Arabia expressed that it is disheartening to not have produced something more. There is a compromise on developing a work programme. The issue is political and affected by issues not moving in other areas.  It was not possible to produce something that was independent of other tracks.

Norway stated that there is a great deal of convergence but need to go further. It supports New Zealand’s suggestion to continue with the two concepts.  Norway also said that it supports the EU, EIG and Australia. It doesn’t want to miss another chance to have international markets that are connected and have standards. It is positive to know that others want to engage on what is needed.

Colombia stated that it also supports a text with clear options and finds that the EU has expressed clear options.

India stated that although the world is warming and time is running out to submit something to the ministers, getting text to the ministers cannot be at the cost of losing principles such as “polluter pays”. Until there is a second commitment period, it cannot agree on a market-based mechanism. The only option it sees is the proposal of Saudi Arabia to a work programme. If nothing is agreed, there should be no text to the ministers.

Ukraine stated that it would like to get all options to the ministers so that the various views in the room are reflected and the ministers have the possibility to make an agreement.

The EU said that new mechanisms are a part of its broader package and also stressed that there has been progress, which is ready for a decision at the ministerial level. It expressed that the options are reflected in the version of the text from 6 December and subsequent versions.  It agrees with New Zealand’s outline of the options.

The facilitator summarized views of Parties. In the case of a new mechanism some say yes, others no, and some maybe. In the case of a framework it is similar, but some that want a framework want it to be strict, others loose. There is some commonality on what to do with the work programme.

He also stated that at this stage it up to the AWG-LCA chair on how to proceed.  As positions are being repeated it is not possible to resolve the issues.

The US stated that it is not comfortable with text going forward to ministers without this group seeing it first. It is a huge problem for its delegation.  It said that refusing to allow us to see a text won’t work for us.

PNG also agreed with the US.

A revised text will be prepared by the facilitator with options for ministers to consider.

We lament the fact that the talks have moved away from the overarching principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” where developed countries, in view of their historical emissions, take the lead and responsibility for mitigation and provide financial resources, promote transfer of and access to environmentally sound technologies, as well as meeting costs of adaptation.

Climate justice requires that developed countries fulfill their obligation to foot the cost of much needed adaptation in developing countries, which much of Asia and the Pacific embraces. While mitigation of emissions is a global concern, developing countries require allowance of emissions or a degree of climate space in order to fulfill their respective paths towards sustainable development to cope with. Alas, no firm commitments and agreements have been made along these lines.

In this context, CLIMATE Asia Pacific calls on governments, non government organizations, people’s organizations and movements across the globe to step up efforts on education on climate change—a key instrument in raising awareness, mindsets, values and skills on the grave climate crisis to mobilize people towards thorough-going solutions.

The clamor for wider climate change education, highlighting a scientific and people-oriented education on climate change comes at a time of great danger for the peoples of Asia Pacific and other vulnerable nations and communities—flooding and alarming sea level rise in coastal communities, prolonged droughts, looming food insecurity and critical shortage of water sources.  The people, especially in the developing world have the right to be sufficiently informed of the dangers they confront, its causes and effects, as well as solutions they can strive for.

Studies on the ground have shown the stark irony of how people burdened with the harsh impacts of climate change are not even aware what climate change is, much less about how to deal with it for their families and communities to survive.

We urge the international community to revitalize its program on climate change education to equip communities with the knowledge to act on the climate challenges that they face.

Education on climate change, a concern that even warranted a separate Article in the UNFCCC, Article 6 on Education, Training and Awareness, was conspicuously missing in the main agenda of the Durban talks. This omission is a cause for alarm, for education on climate change is not merely concerned with mitigation, adaptation and technologies. It involves education that enhances people’s understanding of the root of the climate crisis so that the world will never have to tread on the same mistakes ever again and bring about genuinely sustainable societies.

CLIMATE Asia Pacific

December 9, 2010

The Informal group on various approaches, including opportunities for using markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions, bearing in mind different circumstances of developed and developing countries under the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) has met multiple times informally and in drafting groups to revise the draft text that appeared in the amalgamated draft text of 3 December.

The work of the group has been focused on the first two options presented in the draft text. Option 1 is a streamlined text focused on various approaches, in particular the establishment of a new market-based mechanism under the guidance and authority of the COP. It has also focused on the development of a framework to assess whether approaches developed by Parties meet standards that are to be further elaborated and may be used by developed countries to meet mitigation targets.  Option 2 is a longer text that complies the numerous submissions made by Parties on this subject and includes text on a set of principles to guide the various approaches.

6 December informal group discussions

The Facilitator, Mr. Giza Gaspar Martins of Angola presented a revised Option 1 based on the comments from Parties from the previous two days. He asked for a round of comments to determine the next steps.

Bolivia stated that it is critical on markets and has a major concern with Option 1 that is opening the door to new markets without the examination of markets under the Kyoto Protocol.

Grenada, speaking on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), stated that it finds positive elements in Option 1 because it sets out common standards and finds the introduction of the framework good. It is concerned that some of the specific recommendations of Option 2 are lost. Grenada stated that it assumed that Parties are moving forward with Option 1, but that elements from Option 2 could be captured and suggest to have Option 2 as an Annex to Option 1.

The Facilitator clarified that it is possible to decide that Option 2 is an Annex and serves as basis for continued work.

Papua New Guineastated that Option 1 is not what it asked for, but can work with it. It associated itself with many comments made by AOSIS. It said that positive elements in the text include the provision of a common framework and the allowance of flexibility for efforts by different countries. It also said that it was pleased at the establishment of new market mechanisms and a clear reference to the Cancun decision. It also stated that work on the text from the previous day needs to be captured.

Venezuela expressed its discomfort with the text, as it has legal implications. It stated that common standards to assess approaches developed and implemented by Parties are not defined clearly. It also stated that assessing approaches by Parties implies that national legislation will be reviewed. Venezuela stated that it could not agree to such language without consultation with lawyers and its capital.  It also said that putting SBSTA (Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice under the Convention) in a position to review and approve standards placed by countries goes beyond national sovereignty.

Colombia stated that Option 1 fulfills the mandate given to the group by the COP in Cancun last year. It also stated that specificity in the option is gone. It said that a number of details are missing and the mechanism it proposed is not in Option 1 and a lot of detail is missing. It said that it assumed that this decision text will establish a process by which Parties can build standards, opening the door to more detail. Colombia also expressed it support to continue working on Option 2 to streamline it and make it comprehensible.

Japan expressed that it had substantive concerns. It stated that it wants the fact that countries should be able to set up their own standards reflected in the text rather than an international standard being set up by the COP.

The facilitator commented that international bodies set standards all the time and of course countries can make their own, as it is their sovereign right.

Turkey stated that it finds the text a good basis for discussion and that the text needs some minor finetuning of matters covered before.

Switzerland, speaking on behalf of the Environmental Integrity Group, expressed its support for Option 1 as it is.

The European Union said that the text has progressed with regards to clarity and reflects discussions that have been had in Durban.  It also stated that the text had elements that were important for the EU including the establishment of a new market mechanism based on rules and a clear timeline. It also said that a lot more work needs to be done on Option 2 and supported Colombia’s comments on Option 2.

(The session had to end abruptly since another group was waiting for the room. Therefore the facilitator suspended the meeting and asked to reconvene after 9 pm.)

When the meeting reconvened it became clear that there is not a consensus on the establishment of common standards.  Thus the facilitator reported that a revised text for Option 1 would be presented the following day and stated that Option 2 could be attached as an Annex.

7 December contact group discussions

At the contact group a new version of Option 1 was presented to the group that took into account discussions from the previous day. The phrase “common standards” was changed to “standards”.  Avoidance of double counting has been added as a principle that the standards should fulfill. The “establishment of a framework” was changed to “decides to consider, at its eighteenth session, the establishment of a framework”.

The United States stated that it is more comfortable with this version of the text.  It stated that it was concerned that the language of the text presupposed the outcome. It further commented that post-2012 markets landscape is complex on many levels; movement of emission reduction units must be accounted for from bilateral and unilateral offsetting schemes, as well as activities undertaken by both developed and developing countries an.

It further stated that the US has its own subnational programmes and these should be accommodated and not restrained. It wants to explore these issues, but it is not certain that at all standards and approaches would be approved. It would like to see such options reflected in the text. It is interested in exploring the establishment of a crediting mechanism, but it is not ready to establish it without a work programme to ensure environmental integrity. Therefore it would like to have a design phase prior to its establishment.

Papua New Guinea(PNG) expressed its discontent that the establishment of a framework is now only going to be considered in the eighteenth session rather than be established at the current COP 17.  It would like bottom up approaches that can be approved. It commented that the process of the new mechanism should follow the establishment of the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism); it should first be established, then the modalities and procedures should be developed.  It does not understand why the same approach is now not being applied.

New Zealand stated that is pleased that the text does not put up barriers and obstacles to promote mitigation actions and enhance cost effectiveness. Its key interests are environmental integrity and mitigation goals.

Australia said that it could adopt the text with a few tweaks. It finds that the text is good for mitigation and will be a helpful contribution to address climate change. It likes that there is a dialogue for agreed standards. Some Parties want an immediate establishment, while others can’t move on this now. It said that Australia would like to first design then build. It finds the text a good compromise between the two positions. Australia commented that it would like to see paragraph 8 removed and a few other minor changes. It has suggestions and would like to make them in a drafting group.

Note: Paragraph 8 links market based approaches to emissions reductions commitments and reads as follows: [Decides that a condition on the use of market-based approaches by a developed country Party under paragraph 1 above shall be its inscription of an emission reduction commitment under the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol or adoption of a comparable quantified economy-wide emission reduction target or commitment under the Convention;]

PNG clarified that it is not rejecting the text and has a problem with paragraph 2, which does not immediately establish a framework. While it doesn’t want to speed up the process in any undue way, it wants to have certainty that a framework will happen in the future. Therefore it suggested examining the approach that has been used for the establishment of CCS in the CDM.

Colombia stated that it recognizes that issues of avoidance are very important and that the establishment of a framework in this session is crucial. It felt that the previous text reflected this better.

Venezuela commented that Option 1 does not include many of its issues that were submitted to the Secretariat on various approaches.  This text focuses only on markets, but it should also cover non-market approaches. It finds that the text is currently not balanced.  Venezuela further commented that there is no problem with involving the private sector, but markets cannot be the solution as they are inherently flawed to solve climate change as they don’t have environmental integrity. It also said that there are no principles in Option 1, only in Option 2, which makes it necessary to continue discussion of Option 1. It ended by saying that it was willing to engage in such a discussion under Option 1.

The session ended and group met again in the evening.

At the reconvened evening meeting the facilitator presented another revised draft that reflected the comments made by Parties earlier in the day.  The primary changes included giving the option to establish a framework now or to consider it next year.

The EU asked why there were changes to option 1 when discussion had not concluded on the previous version. It also said that it saw a weakening of the text. There is no consensus on the establishment of a new market mechanism and there is a also a clear division on the extent to which common rules and standards exist. It commented that it wants the text to focus on clear options instead of tinkering with words that blur the issues and makes it difficult to explain to ministers.

Bolivia stated that it is hard to analyze details in a short amount of time. There should be no new market mechanisms before investigating what they do for environmental integrity. It said that it doesn’t feel comfortable with the text and won’t be able to agree to it.

Ecuador stated that it understands that there have been changes to the text to accommodate different views. It believes that the text is a step in the right direction. In the Cancun agreement specific language on principles was agreed to, so it doesn’t understand why principles are being renegotiated.

China stated that the text is a move backwards and unacceptable.  In paragraph one the discussion of legal form has crept into the text as it refers to developing country Parties’ “targets or commitments”. It also said that the revision of paragraph 2 would allow the use of different approaches with different standards and rules, making it impossible to compare efforts. It interprets this as countries using whatever approaches they want, which China cannot accept.

New Zealand stated that the first paragraph implies that the COP decides that countries could use various approaches, but actually it is more correct to state that when countries use various approaches then it may be acceptable under the COP. Countries will use various approaches, but COP will only set the safeguards. New Zealand mentioned that it has submitted something on this. It also said that paragraph 2 predetermines that a framework might be established.

Papua New Guinea stated that it is finding it difficult to understand what is being done here. Parties are stating that the Kyoto Protocol had difficulties with standards, but the Protocol is based on a construct that uses standards; to now say that these are not acceptable is incomprehensible as PNG is looking for a second commitment period.

PNG also stated that it didn’t understand why Parties had a problem with deciding that various approaches could be used under the Convention. The intention is not to dabble in domestic approaches, but the international community can regulate how the approaches will be applied to compliance. It further stated that it was not happy that the option consideration of an establishment of a framework at the eighteenth session (of the COP) was still in the text.

Japan stated that it finds the text has improved and removed some major concerns that it had. There must be clear options to present to ministers and thus Japan proposes a simple option that is middle ground.  It suggested Paragraph 59 from conference room paper CRP.37 which invites Parties to submit information on market mechanisms they are using or may use and also the addition of paragraph 7 of the revised draft requesting SBSTA to organize workshops.

The United States commented that the various iterations of the text illustrate the complexity of issues that Parties are grappling with including mitigation by all countries post-2012. There is lack of clarity, but it is remarkable that all Parties have agreed to come together to figure out how it could work. It further stated that it is necessary to develop a system that accommodates a variety of approaches. As it is necessary to reflect the range of views with options, a solution may be to outline an approach with a series of workshops and a work programme to address these issues over the next year without pre-judging the outcome.

Venezuela stated that it would take on board a proposal from the US that there is no time to examine a broad range of views and would agree to workshops.

The EU stated that it came with clear expectations to establish a new market-based mechanism. This is needed to build up a level of ambition for mitigation. Any further conversation needs to be done based on a decision here. It cannot accept the recommendations by Japan and US, as there are clear options.

New Zealand presented a proposal for moving forward. One option is that Option 1 of the draft text stands; the second option is only discussion and inviting of information; while a third option is no decision.

Australia stated that Parties need to move forward and could perhaps focus on what can be agreed. Paragraphs 6 and 7, inviting views on the establishment of a work programme and workshops, could be agreed to. It may be disappointing to not agree on something more ambitions, but we have to give ministers something that they can agree on.

The facilitator stated that he has heard the need to change a few things and perhaps there is a need to add an option to satisfy parties that have objections to option 1.  The facilitator proposed a short session on 8 December to discuss a revised text that would provide an option to paragraph 2 to address concerns Parties have raised to represent the diversity of views here.

The provisional agenda of the Conference has yet to be adopted, following informal consultations by the South African COP Presidency on three agenda items raised by India relating to equitable access to sustainable development; unilateral trade measures and intellectual property rights (IPRs). In an unusual approach, Parties agreed to continue work on the other agenda items, pending informal consultations on these outstanding issues.

According to sources, these three issues are still being strongly resisted by developed country Parties and a few developing countries from being addressed in the negotiations. This is done through efforts to defer them from being considered here in Durban or to say that these issues are better dealt with in other fora such as the World Trade Organisation (in the case of unilateral trade measures) and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (in the case of IPRs).

Meanwhile, several informal consultations are being held by the COP Presidency on the “bigger picture” under a process called the ‘Indaba’ to address the deadlock over the second commitment period for emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol and the push by developed countries for a new legally binding mitigation treaty under the Convention which will replace the Protocol, with the inclusion of all “major economies” to reflect the “changing economic circumstances and different social and economic development priorities and opportunities”.

As of late Wednesday night (7 December), negotiators were in intense talks in efforts to finalise a decision over the Green Climate Fund (GCF), with the issue of whether and how the Fund is to have legal personality and capacity. According to sources, the United States is resisting efforts by the COP to confer legal personality and capacity to the GCF.

Under the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWGLCA), the Chair, Mr. Daniel Reifsnyder from the US provided Parties with an update of the amalgamation of draft texts at the contact group which met on Wednesday (7 December).

He also provided an overview of the state of the negotiations and suggested possible ways on moving forward, including the need for Ministerial consultations on several issues.

Shared vision

The AWGLCA Chair said the ‘shared vision’ is an example of an issue that Parties may not be able to resolve in further work in the informal group. He said several suggestions have been made by Parties on how to take this work forward. Some Parties urge that all the issues contained in this section be forwarded for further work next year – possibly in a dedicated, more focused process. Others urge that Parties reiterate in particular the need to agree on a long-term global goal (for greenhouse gas emissions reduction) and a time frame for global peaking (of emissions). He believed that this is an issue that would benefit from consultations led by Ministers to help determine the best way forward.

Mitigation

1) Mitigation by developed country Parties: The text on developed country mitigation addresses three areas: biennial reports, international assessment and review, and matters relating to paragraphs 36-38 of the Cancun Agreements (relating to the pledges, level of ambition, accounting rules etc). The Chair said that on matters related to paragraphs 36-38 of the Cancun Agreements, there are several issues arising from the three texts where guidance from Ministers will be required.

The first of these issues relates to clarification of pledges, and a related question of whether these pledges should be translated into other forms. While views differ on the specific activities and timeframe for completion, there is convergence around the need for a continuing process to clarify pledges. However, there is no convergence on translation of these pledges. Some Parties wish to recognize and quantify the ambition gap, while others see no such need.

The AWGLCA Chair believed the way forward may be additional work next year, but Ministerial guidance will also be required on the timeframe for completion and whether this work should focus on the actions of one group of Parties or more broadly.

Similarly on the matter of accounting, he said some Parties call for the development of common accounting rules to guide reporting and assessment of progress toward mitigation targets. Others consider that accounting of targets should be based on national policies and circumstances. His assessment is that a way forward may be found through a work programme to examine specific aspects of accounting for targets, drawing upon ongoing work to clarify pledges.

In the area of biennial reports, his understanding is that the two biggest remaining issues are whether to adopt guidelines at this session, or to defer adoption to next year, and the date of submission of the first biennial reports. He believed that these issues as well as remaining unresolved technical issues can be resolved in our ongoing work in the informal group and do not need to be referred to ministers.

On international assessment and review (IAR), Reifsnyder said there were two major stumbling blocks. First, whether the process involves a compliance assessment and second the accounting framework for the IAR. There are also unresolved technical issues in the text. He believed that work should continue as follows:

On matters related to paragraph 36-38 of the Cancun Agreements, questions related to clarification of pledges, accounting for targets and ambition should be taken up in a consultation led by Ministers. A way forward in each of these areas may be found through elaboration of elements and timeframes for a work program. He recommended that work to finalize text on biennial reports continue under the guidance of the co-facilitators, with the goal of reaching agreement on guidelines that can be adopted at this session. Delegates should proceed with the understanding that the biennial reporting guidelines can be revised in the future to reflect any decision on accounting.

The Chair believed that co-facilitators should continue to work on IAR, with the exception of references in the text to a compliance procedure. Some Parties consider a process to determine compliance a necessary component of ensuring comparability of efforts (between Kyoto Protocol Parties and developed country Parties that are not Parties to the Protocol but are Parties to the Convention), while others consider it fundamentally incompatible with the nature of their pledges. This is a matter on which Minister-led consultations may be needed. (The US is opposed to any discussions on reviewing their pledges and the need for international rules on compliance.)

2) Mitigation by developing country Parties: The amalgamation draft texts contained four areas related to developing country mitigation: matters related to paragraphs 48-51 of the Cancun Agreements (on the pledges), biennial update reports, international consultation and analysis (ICA) and registry.

Reifsnyder said more work on all four of these areas was necessary. Under matters related to paragraphs 48-51 of the Cancun Agreement, Parties generally agree on the need to continue a process to understand the diversity of mitigation actions, but do not agree on the steps or inputs. There are also questions regarding how to enhance mitigation efforts and whether a common approach to measuring the effects of mitigation actions is needed.

On biennial update reports, he said there appeared to be three major options: adoption of descriptive guidelines that elaborate on the elements agreed in Cancun, adoption of guidelines that reference relevant sections of the existing guidelines for national communications of Parties not included in Annex I (developing countries), and deferral of work to next year.

On ICA, key issues are scope, frequency, clarification of the process, and the flexibility accorded to developing countries. The registry text is quite mature, with very few substantive issues remaining, he added.

He believed that matters related to paragraphs 48-51 of the Cancun Agreement should be taken up in Minister-led consultations. His assessment was that co-facilitators should continue with their work on reporting guidelines in the informal group. To ensure balance with progress on developed country biennial reports, the focus should be on agreeing on elements of descriptive guidelines that can be adopted at this session. Although there were a number of unresolved issues that remain under ICA, he believed that co-facilitators should continue to work on them in the informal group.

3) REDD-plus finance (Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries), there was no change in the text and the Chair urged Parties to continue discussions.

4) On cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, he said Parties had made considerable progress in their consultations on the three main areas under consideration – the general framework, agriculture, and international aviation and shipping.  In his view, this item may benefit from consideration by Ministers, who may wish to consider whether there is yet room to establish a programme of work on agriculture. At the same time Ministers may wish to consider whether to establish a process for further developing elements of a general framework for cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions and how it will apply to the various sectors, including international aviation and maritime transport.

5) On various approaches, Reifsnyder said that Parties had made great efforts to progress on the work on various approaches to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and promote, mitigation actions and believed that the informal group should continue to work to agree on an outcome or to develop clean options that can be referred for further consideration in Minister-led consultations. He asked Parties to also consider how best to reflect issues that should be considered if a work programme can be established in this area.

6) On the issue of ‘Economic and Social consequences of Response Measures’, he said that the facilitator prepared a consolidated text on the basis of the six proposals from Parties. He said Parties discussed the consolidated text in the informal group and that it received support from some Parties but that it was not accepted by others. Because of this, and despite the strong urging of some Parties there is still only a facilitator’s text that was not appropriate to be included in the updated amalgamation texts.

He said that it appeared that there were positive developments in the informal consultations being undertaken by the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies (SBI and SBSTA) on the impact of the implementation of response measures, with the objective of developing a work programme to address these impacts, with a view to adopting at the 17th session of the COP, modalities for the operationalization of the work programme and a possible forum on response measures.

(The subsidiary bodies of the Convention are the Subsidiary Body on Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice.)

Adaptation

The AWGLCA Chair said that work on the text on the Adaptation Committee advanced considerably and Parties were able to agree to most of the text thus getting one step closer to bringing the Adaptation Committee to life here at Durban. There were still a number of outstanding technical issues relating to the indicative activities for the Adaptation Committee to undertake. In addition, there are two outstanding issues related to the issue of the membership of the Adaptation Committee and to whether it should report directly to the COP or to the COP through the subsidiary bodies. These were issues he believed would benefit from Minister-led consultations.

Finance

The Chair said that work was progressing well in the informal group on finance and believed that work should continue in the informal group before assessing whether any of the issues with which it is dealing should be taken up at a higher level.

Technology

Reifsnyder said that the informal group on technology managed to narrow down options on the selection process of the host of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and the governance arrangement for the CTCN. It has also advanced significantly on the evaluation criteria for selecting the CTCN. The group also elaborated the funding arrangement of the CTCN.  On the question of intellectual property rights, he said that consultations were currently being undertaken by the Presidency on that issue, and suggested that Parties focus on completing the necessary technical work to launch the CTCN in Durban while awaiting the outcome of these consultations.

Capacity Building

The Chair reported that there are very few outstanding points, and believed they could be resolved in further consultations in the informal group.

Review (2013-2015)

On the review, he said there were mainly two outstanding issues which would benefit from consideration in Ministerial-led consultations. First, the scope of the review: whether it should be limited to the adequacy of the global temperature goal and progress toward achieving it as agreed in Cancun or whether it should be defined more broadly. Secondly, the question of who should conduct the review: whether it should be conducted by an expert review body or by the existing Subsidiary Bodies.

Legal Options (on the outcome of the AWGLCA)

Reifsnyder said that the ‘legal options’ was a difficult issue. He said some Parties noted that they did not see this group as the place to discuss future process issues and saw this conversation happening elsewhere (in an apparent reference to the ‘Indaba’ process led by the South African COP Presidency). Many Parties also made links between this issue and the outcomes of the work of the working group under the Kyoto Protocol. He said the question of the future of the multilateral rules-based regime was now being taken up in the Presidential Indaba process and he believed that it was indeed in that broader Presidential process where this issue could now be advanced.

Several countries had reactions to the Chair’s comments.

Venezuela wanted the issue of the level of ambition to be addressed by Ministers, given that the ambition was rather low and was concerned that the new framework for a regime may be legalized with a low ambition level.  On cooperative sectoral approaches, it wanted a broader approach and not just on the sectors currently being discussed. It was also concerned with the bad treatment of the element of economic and social consequences of response measures and wanted a full consideration of all the issues raised in its submission, including the social consequences of response measures. On the issue of market mechanisms, it said that this was linked to the issue of the continuity of the Kyoto Protocol and was a political issue and wanted a ministerial discussion on this.

Saudi Arabiaalso expressed its frustration on the way the response measures were being handled. It said that there is refusal by the developed countries to engage in the development of negotiation texts. It was concerned by the imbalance in the treatment of this issue and said there was no real engagement on substance on this issue. It also did not share the Chair’s positive outlook over the matter being dealt with in the Subsidiary Bodies as developed countries were refusing to engage on substance. This, it said, was a matter for Ministerial consultations. Speaking for the Arab Group, Saudi Arabia said that it was unacceptable to have no outcome on this issue.  On the sectoral approaches, it said that if this issue was passed on to Ministers, it needed to address the general framework that guides the sectoral issues and without this, it was difficult to reach outcomes.

Boliviawas concerned that the mitigation of developed countries did not address increase in the level of ambition and the need for common accounting rules as well as compliance. It said that the Ministerial consultations need to be open and inclusive. There was need for a decision on compliance and a penalty system.

Chinasaid that the intention of referring issues to the Ministers was to seek political guidance on difficult issues that could not be resolved by negotiators and not for the texts to be referred to them. The AWGLCA contact group and informal groups could then act on the guidance given.

On the issues referred to the Ministers, as regards the discussions on the long-term global goal and peaking, it was important to refer to the associated issues of historical responsibility, equity and means of implementation to achieve the global goal and peaking. On mitigation, it agreed with Venezuela on the need to seek guidance from the Ministers on how to deal with the level of ambition.

India said that Ministerial guidance was useful in unlocking many pieces on mitigation and a lot of work needs to be done to capture the options for the consideration of Ministers. India was concerned that some issues were kicked up to Ministers as in ‘shared vision’ with no more meetings scheduled at the level of negotiators. It said that interactions with negotiators in this regard was useful and urged not to close this interaction.

Ecuador expressed concerns that the mitigation of developed countries was confined to only the Cancun decision and there was no reference to the Convention. On REDD-plus, it wanted movement on the financial mechanism.

The Philippines expressed deep concerns on lack of progress on the element of ‘shared vision’ and ‘review’. Determination of the long-term global goal for emissions reductions must be within the context of issues of survival as well as economic considerations, means of implementation and burden-sharing. It also supported the proposal for a study process in order to guide Parties on the consequences of the decisions being made. On the review, it was important to strengthen the Convention and to determine the scope of the review and said that the existing subsidiary bodies could advance further work. On the Ministerial consultations, Philippines hoped that the Ministers would have the opportunity to go back to their constituencies to ensure the provision of political guidance.

The European Union also stressed the need for a high level of ambition as regards mitigation and was concerned that the amalgamation text was not balanced in relation to the mitigation of developed and developing countries. It also wanted clear options on the establishment of market mechanisms, which is key for the EU to commit to a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

The US said that a number of areas (in the texts) did not reflect its interests and could therefore not participate in its outcome.

Japan stressed the need for parallelism in relation to the mitigation efforts of developed and developing countries and the current text did not reflect this balance.